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ABSTRACT
Mobile interaction mining allows everyday interaction data to be mined for insights into
the best performing design patterns, usability problems, and overall design trends. So far,
this data has primarily come from automated application exploration or crowdworkers com-
pleting smartphone tasks as part of a study. Both of these methods have a primary issue
that the interaction patterns do not quite align with how everyday users interact with appli-
cations. However, mining interaction traces that contain personally identifiable information
from real users presents a problem, mainly when that data is to be published. This thesis
provides an exploratory look at the data curation and privacy considerations required to
share mobile application interaction data publicly. Regarding the privacy side, we will focus
on applications in the Finance and Health categories.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
In recent years smartphones have become ubiquitous and it feels like nearly every busi-
ness has their own mobile application. Apple even created an advertising campaign and
trademark around the phrase “There’s an App For That” [1]. As applications continue to
be built and used for an increasing array of tasks such as food delivery, workouts, viewing
sensitive medical information, banking, and in the future perhaps even voting [2]. All of
this interaction data presents a huge treasure trove of information to be mined of which we
have only begun to scratch the surface. There are technical reasons for this, of course, but
a primary issue with user’s interaction data is that it so often contains private information.
In an attempt to use this interaction data we have created Effective Android UX, from
here on referred to as EAUX , a website meant to inspire Android designers, and crucially
developers acting as designers, creating features for their own application by browsing how
similar features work in other applications [3]. The home page may be seen in Figure 1.1.
This thesis explores two subjects that have proved troublesome during the creation of EAUX ,
data curation and privacy.
1.1 INTERACTION TRACES
A mobile interaction trace, often referred to as a flow in the UX community, is a series
of recorded interactions consisting of some user interacting with a mobile application to
complete some sort of task. These flows can be delineated into commonly observed patterns
that transcend any given application, for example search. An example may be seen in
Figure 1.2. We did this in a data driven manner using the icon and text button classifications
of Liu et al. to create a lexicon of Android UX concepts [4]. The resulting Android UX
concepts can be viewed via the EAUX Lexicon, along with synonyms and a Material Design
icon if it exists [5].
Obviously, interaction traces from real users, as opposed to crowdworkers or automatic
exploration, provide the most realistic data. However, this data often contains information
that users don’t want mined by a third party. Interestingly, much of this information is
already used for advertisement targeting and other personalized services, however, users
tend to accept this data use as the status quo and required for access to many services
[6]. Perhaps this is also partially due to ambiguity of what information is used and the
knowledge that the data is meant to be consumed by large computational systems, not
humans. Asking users to share their information for viewing by humans presents challenges
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that must be addressed.
1.2 CURATION
Little academic literature about the curation of datasets. For example, the Wayback
Machine is an archive of websites that allows users to view how a webpage looked in the
past [7]. While EAUX does not currently allow one to view data across application versions,
the Wayback Machine in many respects is the most similar widely used repository to EAUX .
However, an academic search reveals that most literature looks at the validity of the Wayback
Machine as a tool to peer into the past. The Internet Archive themselves have not published,
via a white-paper or otherwise, information regarding their curation process in a manner
intended to help others creating similar projects. Perhaps this is because the Wayback
Machine is meant primarily for historical rather than research or UX purposes.
As such, this thesis will spend some time talking through the difficulties of curating the
interaction data so that it is presented in a useful manner.
1.3 PRIVACY
Privacy by Design as a concept has been around for several decades, but has taken on
growing importance with the advent of mobile computing devices. In 2001 Marc Langhein-
rich recognized that as computing becomes increasingly ubiquitous it is ever more important
to design systems that are privacy-aware by considering privacy in the very system design
[8]. This issue has since been written about in modern contexts at length [9, 10, 11, 12, 13].
However, as we will see in the Related Works section it has not been until recently that re-
searchers have begun to explore how we can preserve privacy while sharing images publicly
that contain private information.
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Figure 1.1: The home page of EAUX displays a gallery of applications. Mousing over an
application card reveals the flows available, if one would prefer to directly view it instead of
viewing all flows for a given application.
3
Figure 1.2: Results for the UX concept ‘Search.’
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CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORKS
2.1 INTERACTION MINING
All of this research is done in service of Interaction Mining, effectively a Human-Computer
Interaction centric view of Data Mining. In this case, we are specifically talking about
Interaction Mining of Android interaction traces, however, these same principles could be
applied to iOS, web applications, or any other platform for which one is able to collect similar
interaction traces.
ERICA was the first large scale search engine of Android applications [14], exposing more
than 3000 application flows. RICO contained more than 72k unique UI screens for 9700
Android applications, comprising the largest public data set of Android UI information [15].
RICO contains both screenshots and view hierarchies, an XML representation of component
layout analogous to the DOM in web browsers. This data was used to train an autoencoder
capable of comparing UI similarity. Also by Deka et al. the Zero-Integration Performance
Testing platform, ZIPT , used mobile application interaction traces for identifying usability
problems and benchmarking designs against each other.
Another example of interaction mining is SUGILITE, a programming-by-demonstration
system to automate smartphone tasks based on a user provided interaction trace and natural
language command that would be used to invoke the macro [16]. It is capable of analyzing
the interactions and a given verbal command to determine task parameters.
2.2 THE ROLE OF EXAMPLES IN DESIGN
When designing anything, be it a children’s toy, an industrial device, or an application
interface, it is common for designer’s to consult examples of other’s work. This ability to
understand other’s work and build on it is one of the most powerful features of the human
race and has enabled the increasingly rapid pace of change in our society. However, this
raises the question: is it really helpful to consult these examples or is one constraining their
own creativity?
Marsh et al. performed experiments to test Smith, Ward, and Schumacher’s conformity
hypothesis, that is the idea that people’s output during a generative task will conform to
examples shown beforehand [17]. Interestingly, conformity was observed, but examination
of the number of designs, complexity, and noncritical details did not show a clear constraint
on creative output. More recently, a meta-analytical review was done of forty-three design
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studies examining the impact of examples on creative output [18]. Sio et al. found that
participants were likely to copy portions of ideas or ideas outright from the examples shown
to them, and that the more the participants copied the smaller number of ideas they were
able to generate. Those who were shown examples tended to produce less than those who
weren’t shown any examples. However, it is important to note that this is not the entire
picture! It was also found that consulting examples can dramatically improve the novelty
and quality of solutions presented by the participants. This reinforced the use case of EAUX
because a designer or developer will already have an existing application and brand, which
should reduce the direct copying as they try to rework ideas from examples into something
that fits their application context.
2.3 PRIVACY
2.3.1 The Privacy Paradox
Many studies mention the privacy paradox, a way of describing the cognitive dissonance
users exhibit when asked about their privacy concerns compared to what information they
share online [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24]. One way to rationalize the behavior is through Yuan Li’s
dual-calculus model to evaluate both the privacy calculus, defined as the trade-off between
privacy risks and expected benefit, and risk calculus, defined as the trade-off between privacy
risks and coping mechanisms [25].
A 2014 study done found that many users were unhappy with the data collected by their
applications, particularly when talking about it with the study interviewer. However, most
noted with some from of resign that they felt so powerless to stop the data collection and
that they had to put up with it to use applications that addressed important tasks [6].
2.3.2 Privacy by Design
As mentioned in the introduction, privacy by design is critical for information systems and
should be incorporated from the beginning of the design process to avoid problems cropping
up after deployment [26]. Wong et al. is a recent attempt to provide address a shortcoming
of many privacy by design recommendations: they often suggest privacy considerations as
a retroactive process within the larger design process [27]. To address this, they transform
design workbooks into a tool for eliciting privacy values with a methodology taken from
design thinking. A similar argument is laid out by Distler et al., arguing that we need
to take a more human-centered viewpoint when designing user experiences around privacy
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[28]. Another interesting approach to using design thinking for security focused interaction
design is to perform workshops for people to share their previous experiences with a problem
and for people to interact with the new technology being designed [29]. These workshops
then provided designers with user experiences from which they could draw insights into how
different contexts affect the perceived privacy.
The mobile form factor brings with it challenges and privacy concerns that are not always
present in traditional computing environments, namely use in public and whether application
developers can be trusted. There has been some exploration of alternative visualizations that
are meant to provide private information in a manner not easily understood to strangers,
for example by visualizing physical activity as a garden [30]. However, these types of visual-
izations have not caught on. Regarding developer trust, Chin et al. conducted a 60 person
interview based user study regarding their willingness to perform certain tasks in mobile
applications and how they decide to trust applications [31]. They provide recommendations
to developers wishing to create applications that inspire data confidence amongst users.
2.3.3 Privacy Advisors and Privacy Enhancing Systems
The following is a survey of systems that have attempted to put privacy by design into
practice. They are either interventions to encourage behavior consistent with stated privacy
concerns, or systems that enable strangers to view one’s information while preserving one’s
privacy.
Privacy advisors have been a research topic for several years, but have not made any in-
roads in mobile operating systems. Cranor et al. presented a very early privacy advisor that
would take a machine readable version of a privacy policy and provide the user with a report
regarding how the policy aligns with their preferences [32]. Balebako et al. explored the
use of nudge based interventions to direct users towards privacy preserving decisions [33].
Almuhimedi et al. created a system that alerted users how often their location was shared
with applications, noting that the nudges were effective in getting users to reassess their pri-
vacy decisions [34]. Another study examined whether nudges on Facebook helped prevented
unintended information disclosure found mixed results, with some users finding them helpful
and others finding them unnecessary. ProtectMyPrivacy introduced a novel crowdsourced
recommendation system that recommends users allow or reject application permission re-
quests based on other user responses, with a hope of forcing application developers to explain
their data decisions better [35].
More directly related to the work presented here, the following are systems designed to
prevent unwanted information disclosures from images posted to social media or otherwise
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shared publicly. Using a large set of photos from Flickr, which were manually assessed
as public or private photos, researchers created a model capable of performing a natural
language search of a user’s photos and returning two sets of results, one of the photos thought
to be private and one of the public photos [36]. An earlier study from Yahoo! Research
investigated privacy patterns and concerns of users sharing images via smartphones and
social media [37]. Orekondy et al. present two closely related works, one of which presents a
system that automatically identifies and redacts private information and the other allows a
similar system to be tuned to a user’s privacy preferences [38, 39]. Such systems can inform a
user when they are about to share an image that violates their privacy, a feature that would
be quite useful for EAUX . Additionally, Orekondy’s work provides further evidence that
images redacted of private information are still usable by their recipients. Very recently a
first of its kind dataset was released consisting of images taken by blind people that revealed
private information [40]. The dataset shows 8,862 regions displaying private content from
5,537 images. This dataset is meant to facilitate the creation of systems similar to those
mentioned previously here, but with a specific focus on blind users. Another system to
reduce the leakage of private information through pictures attempted to both analyze content
sensitiveness and user trustworthiness in order to make fine grained recommendations for
sharing images on social media [41].
Other systems attempt to allow crowdworkers to do their work without revealing private
information to them that would traditionally be included in the information provided. Kaur
et al. presented a very intriguing system that segments images to workers for them to indicate
sensitive information that shouldn’t be viewed by third party sources [42]. Progressively
segmenting the images at different granularities allows workers to flag the private content
in most cases without seeing all of it themselves. WearMail utilizes an intriguing human
computation element where a user has an information request while on the go for which the
answer is likely in the users email [43]. If an existing search does not exist in the system,
crowdworkers can create a search filter for you by only having access to highly-obfuscated
information, thus preserving your email privacy. The most relevant note for this work is that
crowdworkers were still able to be effective at their task while only having access to highly
redacted data.
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CHAPTER 3: DATA COLLECTION
3.1 SYSTEM
All data collected for this project was done through the backend of the Zero-Integration
Performance Testing (ZIPT ) platform created by Deka et al. [44]. While I did not create
ZIPT , I collaborated to improve the stability of the backend Node.js system, streamlined
the process to acquire APK files for application installation, refined interfaces, and migrated
the database to MongoDB. Migrating the database from RethinkDB to MongoDB allowed
data to be easily transferred from ZIPT to EAUX .
The ZIPT backend is based on a private fork of OpenSTF, which is an open source
project designed to manage a smartphone test farm [45]. This is done over Android Debug
Bridge (ADB), allowing great programmatic control over the devices [46]. OpenSTF would
traditionally be used for a purpose such as testing your Android application on many different
physical devices. It has the capabilities of streaming Android displays over the browser to
power full remote control abilities of many phones. This can be done via a mouse and
keyboard or even on a mobile phone if one wants to retain the same physical interaction
medium. The Data Driven Design Group initially had crowdworkers use the mobile phone
interface to more closely mimic the mobile interaction patterns, but ultimately settled on
the having the workers use a personal computer. A primary reason for this was to have
more screen real estate that enables the crowdworker to view the smartphone display, task
instructions, and other important information such as account credentials, which can be
seen in Figure 3.1. The primary drawback of this interaction method is that has a potential
slight impact on how users interact with applications. I personally found that using the
mouse altered my interactions in certain situations, e.g. if a screen has a back button in the
upper left and the OS level back button I would frequently use the back button from the
application, whereas on a physical device reaching that far is hard and I would always use the
OS level back button. The impact of this is small and more applicable to the performance
testing side of data collection compared to privacy analysis.
Android phones were flashed with a patched version of the Android Open Source Project
(AOSP) [47]. The patch allows for a low latency capture of the view hierarchy, an XML
formatted hierarchy of elements that can be seen on an Android application screen, which is
analogous to the Document Object Model of a web page. The capture of this View Hierarchy
is what enables many of the projects built on data collected from ZIPT [4, 15]. On every
tap a user makes on the application ZIPT saves both a screenshot and the view hierarchy
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associated with the UI. The user is able, and highly encouraged, to use their computer
keyboard rather than the on screen keyboard. We do not capture any data entered with the
computer keyboard.
At various stages the ZIPT system has used Nexus and Pixel phones, however, most
recently we have used emulators, which allows us to scale the number of concurrent devices
in use without purchasing additional expensive Android phones.
3.1.1 View Hierarchies
In addition to the screenshot captured each tap, we also save the view hierarchy associ-
ated with the given screen. While this data was used more extensively in the interaction
mining done for ZIPT , it is relevant to mention here because the view hierarchy contains
all information present in the interface except for user entered data. This means that a
view hierarchy can contain information determined to be private and that would need to
be redacted for the view hierarchies to be publicly released. This has potential implications
for the usefulness of view hierarchies to be included in data sets such as RICO due to them
being incomplete.
3.1.2 Data Collection Interface
The recording interface can be seen in Figure 3.1, which shows the phone screen on the left
hand side, with the right consisting of panes with instructions and other information. An
overlay has been placed over the home and overview OS level buttons, to reduce the chances
of user’s leaving the application and being confused. When the overlay is clicked it sends an
ADB request to launch the activity associated with the application selected for recording.
The additional panes of information previously contained account login information for the
provided dummy accounts and also tabs to check the SMS and email for verification links
and codes.
3.2 HANDLING OF PRIVATE DATA
Originally, openSTF did not have an encrypted connection between the phones and the
command and control system. We encrypted the websockets to protect the screenshots
and other information in transit. We do not record any keyboard input from users, only
touch based input and the screenshots. Users are heavily encouraged to use their computer
keyboard, instead of the on screen keyboard, to both keep the data clean for editing purposes
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Figure 3.1: The recording interface displays both the streamed Android display and account
information if the user does not want to use their own account.
and to avoid capturing information like passwords. We present the screenshots to the user
for redaction before they are posted, and will only post redacted copies of screenshots on
EAUX . The method of redaction is simply blacking out a rectangle of pixels, the data cannot
be revealed through any manipulation. The un-redacted images and view hierarchies will be
kept for analysis on a secure server that does not host any public content.
3.3 DATA SOURCES
Data for EAUX largely came from researchers within the Data Driven Design Group. The
goal was to obtain initial coverage of the Play Store categories, with applications prioritized
based on their ranking in the free application list. For the study presented here on redacted
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screens we recruited a designer and Android developer.
3.4 LEXICON
As previously mentioned, we created a lexicon of UX concepts found in an analysis of
Android applications, part of which may be seen in Figure 3.2. The EAUX Lexicon was
used to label sub-traces from the long recorded traces.
3.5 TRACE EDITING & REDACTION
During the recording process, users are encouraged to explore the mobile application and
utilize core features. After they are finished they may view their recorded trace so that they
can both redact private information and split the trace into specific UX flows. For example,
a user may spend fifteen minutes recording an application and during that time, among
other things, search for a product before adding it to the cart. The whole trace would be
way too long to be useful for a designer and is not conducive to searching with our current
infrastructure. Instead, we ask the user who recorded the trace to review their data and
split it into appropriate sub-traces that correspond to interaction concepts from the EAUX
Lexicon. This interface may be seen in Figure 3.3.
In addition to splitting the raw interaction traces into flows, we ask users to also redact
any private information before publishing the flows. As mentioned in the Related Works
section, there is plenty of previous work showing that images with such redaction can still
be useful to others, and in particular useful for knowledge workers. The redaction interface
may be seen in Figure 3.4.
3.5.1 Difficulties
Editing the data to produce a high quality, consistent user experience for designers vis-
iting EAUX is quite difficult and time consuming. We recognize this process is very time
consuming and would greatly benefit from intelligent tools to help the editors, particularly
given the need for scale.
We present some of the primary challenges faced while editing interaction traces for
EAUX :
1. The user doesn’t always navigate applications in a manner that is consistent with the
sequence an editor would use to present the UIs. This also poses a potential problem
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Figure 3.2: For every UX concept the EAUX Lexicon lists any synonyms, a Material Design
icon (if one exists), an average icon (average of all icons with the same label as determined
by Liu et al.), and some sample icons found in real Android applications.
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Figure 3.3: This interface enables a user to redact screens, select screens to create a subflow
with an associated UX concept, delete screens, delete the flow entirely, and toggle whether
or not the trace is published to EAUX .
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Figure 3.4: After selecting a screen for redaction a modal pops up with this redaction
interface. Here you can see that the user’s profile name has been redacted.
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for automatic flow detection.
2. EAUX Lexicon contains 176 UX concepts, all of which are quite difficult to keep in
mind while editing which leads to mislabeled flows and subflows not being labeled, e.g.
a filter flow inside of a search flow. Reducing the number of UX concepts is not a great
solution because the concepts were created in a data driven manner, so their existence
means that they are used in applications.
3. Ensuring consistency while following editorial guidelines can be tricky. In certain ap-
plication contexts rules that were meant to address particular cases may feel inappro-
priate. Additionally, using multiple editors is likely to lead to multiple interpretations
of editing rules, which can frustrate users when faced with inconsistent search results.
Lastly, while enabling designers to record and edit their own traces is an important step
to scale EAUX , it is very likely to increase the problem of flow editing inconsistency.
4. It is not always clear where a flow should begin and end. A pragmatic solution is
to begin exactly with the primary interaction, for example a search flow’s first screen
should be the user tapping the search icon or field, however, sometimes this feels like
it leaves out important context. Regarding the end of flows, it is not always obvious
how many screens are needed to convey the necessary information. For example, one
must decide how much browsing of search results to include for a search flow.
3.5.2 Guidelines
This section makes recommendations based on our experience editing interaction traces
into flows associated with UX concepts meant to serve as design examples. These recommen-
dations are provided in the hope that they can save other’s time and improve their editorial
process.
Reducing the data collected is obviously the surest way to address privacy concerns, but
ultimately some information is needed for many of the tasks we wish to complete on smart-
phones. Health and Finance applications are two prime examples where you need the sensi-
tive data to provide nearly any useful service that is catered to your personal situation. In
cases like this, it is vital that we explore how user interfaces and experiences can be designed
such that they inspire trust and confidence in their users.
We make the following suggestions for editing interaction traces:
1. Editing is initially best done as a group in an iterative open coding session. This is
extremely critical for building consistency amongst editors to maintain a high quality
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Figure 3.5: Flows should only encompass more than one concept if another concept is within
the main concept, e.g. a filter within a search. Here the create comes before share, so this
create flow should end on the fourth screen and a share flow would consist of the last two
screens.
repository of UX flows.
2. The number of editors should be kept small, and they should ideally be people with an
interest in design, curation, and upholding an editorial standard. The idea of curation
is perhaps worth stressing if the editors are volunteers, as it could be good motivation to
ensure the editors can see and feel how their work has an impact on Android designers
and developers.
3. A flow should only contain another concept if it truly doesn’t make sense without it.
For example, a search with filter where the user continues the search after the filter. An
example demonstrating how to decouple concepts in a flow can be seen in Figure 3.5.
4. Browse should not be used for huge aimless flows that browse many parts of an appli-
cation. Those should be broken up into small flows that showcase features individually.
Only if there is truly no appropriate concept to describe a flow should browse be used.
5. Small and obvious interactions, such as changing a quantity dropdown, should likely
be omitted from flows for brevity. This may be seen in Figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.6: Here it is obvious what the select field does, so the second and third screens
could be dropped for brevity.
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CHAPTER 4: REDACTION STUDY
To examine what content users consider to be private information, we will ask users to
redact traces of applications containing Health & Fitness or Finance data. These categories
have been chosen because they are likely to contain information that many would consider
private throughout the application.
4.1 PARTICIPANTS
We recruited one designer and Android developer. The designers all have experience
designing for mobile and the developer is an Android developer. Using designers and devel-
opers as the participants for this study is important because the interaction data exposed on
EAUX is meant to provide inspiration for those creating Android applications. To provide
this inspiration one must still be able to see and understand enough information on screen
to understand the context of the interactions. Thus, using designers and developers for this
study forces them to think carefully about what they want to redact, balancing their per-
sonal privacy concerns with their concerns as a designer for understanding the interaction
context.
4.2 PROTOCOL
First, we reviewed the system with participants and made it clear that while we will not
post any redacted information publicly, we will, at least temporarily, retain the unredacted
screenshots and view hierarchies for purposes of characterizing the information redacted.
We also provided a background of EAUX and the redaction interface before presenting
the participants with two pre-recorded traces (Strava and Merrill Edge), so that we could
compare how participants redacted the same information. Then we presented the recording
interface and asked them to record a trace for a suitable application of their choosing. Finally,
they redacted the trace they just recorded and we asked them the following questions:
1. How did you balance redaction with preserving the interaction context?
2. Can you describe the types of information that you redacted?
3. Are there any pieces of information that you considered redacting but decided not to?
4. Are there any tasks for which you would trust a traditional website or application more
than a mobile application?
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4.2.1 Redacted Information Characterization
As made clear to participants, we kept the unredacted data on a private computer that does
not host EAUX or other publicly available data. This was done to allow us to characterize
the both the types of information that was redacted and that which was not. For the
purposes of this thesis, this characterization was done as an open coding by one researcher.
20




Strava is a mix of a Health & Fitness and Social application. It allows users to upload
runs, hikes, bike rides, and other activities with GPS data, workout data, and pictures. As
a result the interfaces are full of personal information such as where one was at a specific
time. Thus we selected it as one of the provided traces.
Participant one was significantly more conservative in what they deemed to be private.
They were interested in redacting the names of professional athletes stating that there is
something personal in knowing one’s interests. For an activity corresponding to a Tour de
France stage they redacted the distance and duration of the event but left the activity name,
time, and map showing as seen in Figure 5.1.
When it came to friends’ activities participant one was very strict about redacting infor-
mation that revealed their friends’ behavior as seen in Figure 5.2. They redacted friend’s
names, avatar pictures, posted pictures, activity time, duration, distance, and the names of
locations on the map and elsewhere. They redacted this information across multiple con-
texts. They were okay with leaving time that has no reference, for example “2 hours ago”
in a notification. They left units where possible but would delete the numbers.
Participant two was okay with all of the professional athlete data being shown, as they
considered it to be public information because it was posted by the athletes themselves.
Participant two agreed about redacting name and avatar photos for activities belonging
to regular users as can be seen in Figure 5.3. They debated about whether they would
redact the number of achievements, activity map, activity distance, and activity duration
but ultimately decided not to redact these pieces of information. They felt that photos
uploaded for activities should be redacted if they contained people.
Both participants felt that redacting activity names and other messages varied on a case
by case basis. For example, generic messages such as “Easy Run” or “I’ll never get bored of
running on the boardwalk” were okay to leave, but they both would redact “Run with old
water polo coach.” This can be seen in Figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.1: Participant one considered pro-
fessional athlete’s data to be private because
it revealed their interests.
Figure 5.2: Participant one redacted infor-
mation that could identify users or that was
revealing of behavior, e.g. activity time.
Merrill Edge
Merrill Edge is an electronic securities trading platform from Bank of America that clearly
falls in the Finance category. We selected Merrill Edge because the portfolio data is at the
same time extremely personal, but also could be considered OK to share publicly if the
portfolio owner is not known.
Participant one redacted the portfolio owner’s name, the portfolio value, portfolio value
changes, and portfolio asset distribution as seen in Figure 5.5. Percentages changes for the
portfolio were left in a variety of graphs, but any axis which showed an absolute amount
was redacted. The dollar signs were left on the axis to preserve the meaning of the graph.
Participant one continued to try and redact small portions of information that left bits to
provide context, for example in one place they redacted the numbers but not the ‘\’ of a
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Figure 5.3: Participant two was significantly
more lax about the information considered
private.
Figure 5.4: Relatively generic messages such
as this activity name were deemed not per-
sonal by both participants.
date to indicate it was a date.
Participant one redacted the number of shares and value of their holdings, noting that the
red color provided context for what the interface was trying to convey as seen in Figure 5.6.
They were okay with leaving the security name showing. On an account activity page
participant one left the deposit source and date for context, but redacted the payment
amount. Both participants remarked that info in the background of modal should still be
redacted. They also both redacted the account number.
Participant two originally was interested in redacting the account owner’s name, account
number, and any numbers that indicated the portfolio value or absolute changes to the
portfolio value. Percentage changes, portfolio allocations, and account activity (dividend
payments) were deemed fine for posting publicly. However, the participant later decided
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Figure 5.5: Participant one felt that their
portfolio information was very private even
though there was no association between
them and this information. Participant two
only redacted the account holder’s name.
Figure 5.6: Participant one felt that their
asset holdings were private. Participant two
redacted nothing on this screen.
that they were OK with the portfolio value being shared because there would be no way to
connect the value with them.
5.1.2 User Recorded Traces
One Medical
Participant one selected One Medical for their own recording and redaction. One Med-
ical is a health care application that allows one to book appointments, refill prescriptions,
message providers, and receive online treatment from experts for common health issues.
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On the login screen participant one blocked their email, but was fine with password length
being available to someone who counted the number of ‘*.’ Once logged in participant one
redacted their name, name of doctors visited, office locations, and time of visits as seen in
Figure 5.7.
Next the participant used the “Treat Me Now” feature to receive expert help through the
application after filling out a questionnaire specific to their inquiry. The participant selected
“Yeast Infection” which prompted a very interesting conversation regarding whether they
would feel comfortable posting the trace publicly. Despite the extremely personal nature
of the questions asked they decided they were OK with the questionnaire responses being
made public because the questionnaire was not personalized to them and there was no
connection from the responses to them. After the questionnaire the user was asked to select
a pharmacy in case medicine was prescribed. The participant redacted details about the
specific Walgreens pharmacy, but left the name Walgreens showing.
Health Mate
Participant two selected Health Mate for their own recording and redaction. Health Mate
is an application for general health tracking of information such as weight, heart rate, sleep,
and step data.
Participant two also redacted their email on the login screens while leaving their obfuscated
password. Once inside the application the participant left almost all information showing,
only redacting avatar profile pictures and names. This can be seen in Figure 5.8.
5.2 INTERVIEW RESPONSES
The participants shared similar views on information that was directly identifying to
themselves or other regular users. Information like names and pictures were always redacted.
However, there were two schools of thought when it came to personal, but not identifying,
information. One participant thought that information such as portfolio details and time
and location of friend’s activities should be redacted. The other participant thought that if
these screens are presented without any connection to the owner or other directly identifying
information that this information was fine for public display. This clearly demonstrates that
if EAUX allowed designers to post their own traces and wishes to retain a high level of
interface context that their should not be a forced association between the designer’s identity
and the traces they post.
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Figure 5.7: Participant one felt that their
portfolio information was very private even
though there was no association between
them and this information. Participant two
only redacted the account holder’s name.
Figure 5.8: Participant two was fine reveal-
ing their health information as long as their
family member’s identities were redacted.
All participants responded that they would have no issue completing sensitive tasks on a
smartphone. They did mention that they have seen their parents continue to use a desktop
computer for online banking rather than mobile applications, but it was not clear that this
was due to privacy concerns.
5.3 DISCUSSION
During the study it became quite clear that while the general interaction context was
preserved there were certain cases where interface context was lost and alternative methods
of redaction would be preferred. Participants suggested the ability to blur sections rather
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than completely redact them and also suggested that labeling redacted sections could pre-
serve interface context. For example, blurring faces in images or small bits of text is more
aesthetically pleasing and makes it a bit more clear what information used to be there. In
some cases it was possible to redact just a numeric value but leave units or some other
information that preserved, but in other cases redacting the information left it unclear what
type of information used to reside there. In these cases a participant suggested that it would
be nice to be able to apply a label on top of the redacted space which would allow designers
to perceive more of the interface context.
Additionally, it became obvious that to conduct such a study one need not present par-
ticipants with a continuous sequence of screenshots. In many cases the screens immediately
following a screen that was redacted would have either the exact same information or very
similar information. In these cases we did not feel that we gained any further understand-
ing of privacy concerns by seeing participants redact the same information repeatedly. In-
stead, participants should probably be shown five to ten screens from an application that
present different types of information or information in different contexts that could affect
the participants decisions. About five screens was enough to have a good understanding
of a participants redaction style if the participant was consistent. Up to ten screens may
be needed if a participant is inconsistent or if the application has many different types of
personal information.
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CHAPTER 6: FUTURE WORK & CONCLUSION
In this work we have presented the curation and privacy challenges faced when using in-
teraction traces from users’ real accounts publicly. Specifically, we explored privacy concerns
of Android users as it related to sharing screenshots of applications likely to contain a lot of
private information. The curation guidelines were shared as a guide for future researchers
wishing to create a similar system.
6.1 FUTURE WORK
The work presented in this thesis is largely exploratory and designed to both further
understand the problems that interaction mining can solve and how interaction mining can
be made more powerful. This has been largely centered around how interaction traces can
be used to provide designers with inspiration for design. There are certainly many other
uses of interaction mining, some of which have been mentioned in the related works section.
6.1.1 Scale
EAUX currently only has data from 110 applications and this privacy study was only
done with six and four unique applications. This is very small in comparison to the RICO
dataset which has over 9200 applications. It is important to grow this data in a way that
preserves the richness of the user interactions present here.
While scale in terms of application coverage is important, it is unfortunately only half the
battle. Applications are updated often and so there is also a need to re-crawl applications
that have been updated. This means we need to find a way to sustainably scale the dataset.
6.1.2 Sustainability
As any smartphone user knows, most applications are frequently updated to include new
features, fix bugs, or to make general changes such as to the interfaces. An analysis done by
Appbot of the top 200 free applications showed that it had been twenty-two days since the
last update on average with a median of eight days [48]. The median update frequency was
eighteen days. This huge churn of applications means that it does not take very long for the
interfaces shown on a site such as EAUX to no longer represent what a user would see if
they used the application that day. This is a big issue because a primary value proposition
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of EAUX is meant to be that someone can see what many applications look like quickly,
without having to install the applications themselves.
The update frequency of mobile applications means that one really needs near constant
data collection to stay relevant. An obvious solution to this is to gather data from everyday
smartphone use, an idea that will be discussed further in the next subsection.
6.1.3 Data Source
An ideal source of data would be to pay users for the data, in an arrangement similar to
Nielson or the Facebook Study Program [49]. However, privacy is a large concern for such an
arrangement which is why we need studies exploring what information users are comfortable
sharing.
As mentioned previously in this work, automated application exploration may prove use-
ful in the future if you are able to train an agent based on the interaction data collected
by humans. However, the largely random interaction attempts currently executed by many
software frameworks are not suitable for gathering the interaction data needed. Crowdwork-
ers are also not ideal because they operate on extremely different incentive structures than
real users. A crowdworker is heavily incentivized to finish tasks quickly to make money,
whereas a real user actually needs to complete the task.
6.1.4 Private Information Detectors
In this work the users were asked to redact all their own data. Further examination of
this data could enable systems to detect potentially private information and propose screen
regions for redaction. Such a system could be set to a certain disclosure threshold based
on studies like this, with users filling out a survey to assess their privacy concerns and then
data being used to create classifiers associated with certain levels of privacy. Users of an
on device recording system could take the same survey and have information automatically
scrubbed on device before it is sent off device for analysis.
6.1.5 Operating System Level Privacy
Classifiers such as those mentioned in the previous section and the Related Works could
theoretically be incorporated at the mobile operating system level in the future. While all
of this research has been done on the Android system, such a system fits in with the image
and platform ideals that iOS has recently been striving for. One could imagine a system
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that offered to automatically scrub personal details from a screenshot before sending it to
someone.
6.1.6 Automatic Flow Detection
Splicing a recording into multiple flows is a time consuming process as mentioned earlier.
A system that could detect the start and stop of a flow for a given concept from a larger
trace would be extremely invaluable in scaling data sets such as EAUX .
6.1.7 Other Application Categories
Obviously applications in other categories have personal information that users may not
want shared with others. Particularly, social applications with settings to reduce the visibility
of posts and other information. Tickets from travel and event applications are other “high
risk” data, as the barcodes often produced by such applications are easy to steal from an
image. Additionally, users may care more or less about certain pieces of information in
different contexts.
6.1.8 Additional Form Factors
All interaction data was collected from smartphones so the data is only relevant for devices
with a traditional smartphone screen. Applications designed for tablets have significantly
more screen real estate and thus in certain cases have the potential to expose a lot more
private information.
6.1.9 iOS
Largely for technical reasons all of this data is from Android applications. Android has
quite different interaction patterns so this data would be less helpful for iOS designers. This
due to separate design systems developed and encouraged to be used by the developers for
the iOS and Android ecosystems. The hardware differences between iPhone and Android
also has an impact on how users interact, with iOS historically having only a home button
while Android has a back, home, and overview button. Lastly, in recent years Apple has
made a strong appeal to privacy conscious consumers and as a result iOS users may have
different opinions about privacy.
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Adding data from iOS would allow EAUX and other tools built on interaction mining to
offer insights for the two largest mobile platforms in Western countries. Given that Apple’s
review process for applications considers design as part of the process, it could be useful to
have a tool such as EAUX to see designs that have made it past review. However, as iOS
is not an open source project we are unable to make small modifications to the operating
system for saving the iOS equivalent of a view hierarchy.
6.1.10 Additional Demographics
Designers and developers have a technical knowledge that certainly has some affect on their
opinions of privacy. While we had reasons for choosing designers as our study participants,
a larger scale study should include participants with a wide range of backgrounds.
Additionally, all data has been collected from people located in the United States and
largely for applications built for a Western market. China and other Asian countries have
seen tremendous mobile growth that in many ways eclipses that of Western countries. Super
applications like WeChat have radically transformed what it means to be a mobile application
for many consumers, and designers in such a market would likely find little use in EAUX .
To address this, EAUX would have to collect data from applications such as WeChat and
Meituan likely from users outside of the United States.
6.2 CONCLUSION
In this thesis we have presented some of the difficulties regarding the creation of a website
that lets users view mobile interaction flows for design inspiration. We focused on both
the editorial and privacy challenged faced while building a high quality data set for these
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